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THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL POWER
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 30, 1973, Richard Kleindienst resigned as Attorney Gen-
eral, citing his close personal relationships with individuals who had
become suspects in the \Vatergate investigation.1 The same day, Presi-
dent Nixon announced the nomination of Defense Secretary Elliot
Richardson to succeed Kleindienst as Attorney General.-
Also on the same day, the Democratic governors, meeting in Huron,
Ohio, called for the appointment of an independent special prosecutor to
direct the Watergate investigation,' and in Washington, Robert Me-
serve, then president of the American Bar Association, echoed their call
On May 1, the Senate adopted a resolution calling for the appointment
of such a special prosecutor.;
On May 2, Senator John Tunney, a member of the Judiciary Commit-
tee, said he would attempt to block committee approval of Richardson's
nomination to be Attorney General, unless Richardson agreed in advance
to name a special Watergate prosecutor.' While unwilling to go as far
as Tunney, other senators on the Judiciary Committee expressed the be-
lief that Richardson would name a special prosecutor before his nomina-
tion came before the Committee
Under heavy pressure, on May 18 Richardson announced that, if con-
firmed, he would name former Solicitor General Archibald Cox to be
the Watergate Special Prosecutor.' Later, during the Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings on his nomination, Richardson presented to the
Committee a series of detailed guidelines which would goverh the Of-
fice of the Special Prosecutor.9 The guidelines were subsequently pro-
mulgated as administrative regulations of the Department of Justice.'0
The guidelines provided:
1 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1973, at 1, coL 7.
21d.
3 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1973, at 32, col. 8.
4Id.
5 N.Y. Times, May 2, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
6N.Y. Times, May 3, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
7Id.
8 Washington Post, May 19, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
9 Hearings before the Senate Committee on the judidary on the nomination of Elliot
Richardson, 93d Congress, 1st Sess., at 144-146 (1973).
1a 38 Fed. Reg. 14688 (1973).
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(1) "The Attorney General will not countermand or interfere
with the Special Prosecutor's decisions or actions."'"
(2) The Special Prosecutor would have "he greatest degree of
independence that is consistent with the Attorney General's statutory
accountability for all matters falling within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Justice."'"
(3) The Special Prosecutor would be given "full authority" to
determine "whether or not to contest the assertion of 'Executive Priv-
ilege' or any other testimonial privilege." 13
(4) "The Special Prosecutor will not be removed from his duties
except for extraordinary improprieties on his part."' 4
However, when asked by Senator Tunney if he could define the term
"extraordinary improprieties," Richardson replied: "No, I don't think I
could, really."' 5 He added, "I can't conceive, as a matter of fact, of Pro-
fessor Cox . . . being guilty under any circumstances of extraordinary
improprieties."' 6 On May 23, Richardson's nomination was confirmed
by the Senate.YI
Then on July 16, 1973, in surprise testimony before the Senate Water-
gate Committee, former White House aide Alexander Butterfield re-
vealed that the President had electronic listening devices in his office
which would have recorded presidential conversations with John Dean
and other key figures in the Watergate investigation.' 8  Butterfield's
statement was confirmed by the White House the same day,"' but the
President later refused a request to surrender specified tape recordings
of Watergate-related conversations to the Special Prosecutor, who then
moved to subpoena them.20 When the subpoena was ignored, Cox peti-
tioned the district court for an order-directed to the President-to
show cause why the tapes should not be produced. White House attor-
neys countered that the tapes were protected by the doctrine of executive
privilege.
1128 C..R. § 0.37 (1973).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 ld.
15 Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the nomination ofl lliot
Richardson, 93d Congress, 1st. Sess., at 177 (1973).
16 Id.
17 N.Y. Times, May 24, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
18 N.Y. Times, July 17, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
19d.
2 0 N.Y. Times, July 24, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
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In ruling on the matter,"' Chief Judge John J. Sirica conceded that
"there can be executive privileges that will bar the production of evi-
dence, ""2 but held that the scope of the privilege was to be determined
by the courts, rather than by the Executive as a matter of his discretion.
Judge Sirica ordered production of the tapes for in camera screening to
determine which parts, if any, of the tapes should be forwarded to the
grand jury.
Both sides appealed. On October 12, 1973, Judge Sirica's order was
affirmed by the court of appeals, sitting en banc.? This time, the Presi-
dent declined to appeal. He also refused to comply with the court's
order, and, instead, proposed to release summaries of the tapes, authenti-
cated by Mississippi Senator John Stennis, who would hear the actual
tapes in their entirety. "4 Nixon also ordered the Special Prosecutor to
stop seeking presidential tapes and documents through the judicial pro-
cess.
2 5
In a televised press conference, Cox announced that he would not
comply with the President's order."' Nixon then ordered Attorney Gen-
eral Richardson to fire Cox. Richardson refused, and resigned, citing
the promises he had made at his confirmation hearings. , The President
then directed Deputy Attorney General William Ruckleshaus to fire
Cox.2 s He also refused, and was himself fired." Then, Nixon appointed
Solicitor General Robert Bork as acting Attorney General, and directed
him to discharge the Special Prosecutor. Bork obeyed.30
This note examines the legality of the dismissal of the Special Prose-
cutor, and its probable consequences for the Justice Department and
the Nation.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE REMOVAL POWER
The extent of the President's power to remove other governmental
officials from office has been called "an unsettled problem of American
2 1 1n re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1973), affd ub. now. Nixon
v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
22 360 F. Supp. at 5.
2 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2 4 TIME, October 29, 1973, at 12.
25 Id. at 19.
2Id. at 25.
27 Id
28 Id. at 12.
29 Id.
so Id.
1974]
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constitutional law."' Article II, § 1 of the Constitution provides that
the "executive Power shall be vested" in the President, and article II, §
2 grants the President certain powers of appointment. But the Constitu-
tion nowhere explicitly grants the President the power to remove those
whom he appoints.
The President's removal power was not discussed at the Constitutional
Convention. One historian has written that a "fear of political power
. . . pervaded Revolutionary thinking"8 8 and that the American people
"were in no mood to give a faraway, central regime in the United States
what they were busy denying to a faraway, central regime in Britain
.... , These factors may at least partially explain the reluctance of the
framers explicitly to grant the President the power of removal. In one
early case, a state court judge even expressed the belief that the Consti-
tution would not have been ratified had it vested unlimited removal
power in the President.85
Writing in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton argued that Senate
approval was-required to "displace as well as appoint," 80 a requirement
Hamilton believed would help bring about a "steady administration."' ,
Regardless of the merits of Hamilton's view, it was not incorporated into
the Constitution, and was never generally adopted. Instead, after con-
siderable debate,3 the members of the first Congress, in establishing the
Department of Foreign Affairs, provided by clear implication that the
head of the department could be removed by the President." Similar
provisions were made in the acts establishing the Departments of War40
and Treasury.4'
One of the earliest judicial statements on the removal power occurred
in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison.42 Marbury had been ap-
31 Note, Constitutional Law-Removal Power of the President, 13 VA. L REV. 122 (1926).
32 See generally M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1966).
33 C. ROSSiTER, 1787: THE GRAND CoNvENTioN 47 (1966).
34 Id.
3.3 Fields v. People, 3 Il. (2 Scamm.) 79, 165-166 (1839).
-
30 T E FEDERALIST No. 77, at 459 (Mentor ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
37 Hamilton's suggestion must be viewed in light of his apparently intense desire for
stability in government. The same concern led him to advocate a long term for the Presi-
dent, fearing the disquieting effect of half a dozen former chief executives "wandering among
the people like discontented ghosts and sighing for a place which they were destined never
more to possess . . . ." Id. No. 72, at 438.
38 1 Annals of Congress 383-399, 473-608 (1789).
30 1 Star. 29 (1789). The precise language was "whenever the said principal officer
shall be removed from office by the President of the United States."
40 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
41 1 Star. 65 (1789).
425 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Vol. ;
NOTES
pointed a Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia in the waning
hours of the administration of President John Adams, but lack of time
prevented the delivery of his commission. The incoming Jefferson admin-
istration was understandably resentful of Marbury and the other "mid-
night judges," and Jefferson's Secretary of State, James Madison, refused
to deliver Marbury's commission.
Marbury then sought mandamus in the Supreme Court. In his famous
decision, Chief Justice Marshall remarked:
As the law creating the office gave the officer a right to hold it for five
years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable,
but vested in the officer legal rights which, are protected by the laws of
his country.43
The Court declined to issue mandamus, however, holding that the act of
Congress which purportedly granted the Court original jurisdiction to
issue mandamus was in conflict with article III of the Constitution, and
was therefore invalid.
It is possible, of course, that Marshall's assertion that the President
lacked the power to remove Marbury after appointment was only dictum,
since the Court's holding-that it lacked original jurisdiction in manda-
mus-was clearly not dependent on the removal power. On the other
hand, had the President possessed the power to remove Marbury from
his office, it would have been unnecessary to consider whether or not to
issue mandamus. It is highly unlikely, even though subject matter juris-
diction is logically determined at the outset of a case, that Marshall
would have reached the vital constitutional issue decided, had it been
possible to dispose of the case easily on other grounds.
Afarbury is distinguishable from most cases involving presidential re-
moval, since it involved a judicial, and not an executive officer." Even
if the case could not be distinguished, Marshall's statement on the re-
moval power has not been followed in subsequent decisions of the Court.
The Supreme Court discussed the removal power again in Ex Parte
Hennen, 5 a case often cited for much more than it held. The decision
involved Duncan Hennen, the clerk of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Hennen had been appointed to his
43 Id. at 162.
44 The fact that Congress limited the term of office to five years, however, implies that
the office, even though judicial in nature, was created pursuant to article I of the Constitu-
tion, and not article III. Article III judges hold office during good behavior, and not
for a spedfied term of years. See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 11, at 29
(2d ed. 1970).
45 38 U.S. (13 Per.) 230 (1839).
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position pursuant to an act of Congress granting both the Supreme Court
and the district courts the power to appoint clerks for their respective
courts. In May of 1838, Hennen was dismissed by a district jpdge, who
also appointed Hennen's successor. Hennen then sought a writ of man-
damus compelling his reinstatement.
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court stated: "[Ilt was very early
adopted, as the practical construction of the Constitution, that this power
[of the President to remove officers appointed with the concurrence of
the Senate] was vested in the President alone."40 The Court held, how-
ever, that the power to appoint clerks for a district court was vested ex-
clusively in that court, and that the Supreme Court therefore had no con-
trol over the removal.47 Mandamus was denied. The Court's statement
concerning the President's power of removal was clearly dictum, since it
in no way affected the precise issue decided; no presidential removal was
involved in the case.
In United States v. Perkins,48 the Court considered the case of a naval
cadet-engineer who had been discharged by the Secretary of the Navy,
simply because his services were "not required." A statute of Congress
provided that no officer could be dismissed from the armed services ex-
cept upon court-martial. Following his dismissal, the cadet sued in the
Court of Claims to recover lost wages. Article II, § 2 of the Constitution
provides that Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior offi-
cers in the President, the courts, or in the heads of Departments. In
holding the cadet's dismissal invalid, the Court stated: "We have no
doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior offi-
cers in the heads of Departments it may limit and restrict the power of
removal as it deems best for the public interest."'"0  Perkins established
the precedent, still binding today,"' that where Congress vests the power
of appointment in some official other than the President, it may restrict
and regulate the manner in which the appointee may be removed.
The Court considered the President's power of removal in Parsons
v. United States.51 Lewis Parsons, a U.S. Attorney appointed for a term
of four years, had been dismissed by President Cleveland before the ex-
piration of his term. After examining a number of statutes, including
the statute under which Parsons was appointed, the Tenure of Office
4t1d. at 259.
47 Id. at 261.
48 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
49M. at 485.
50 See White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868, 869 (D.C. Cir., 1958); Carter v. Forrestal, 175
F.2d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir., 1949).
5' 167 U.S. 324 (1897).
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Act,52 and its modifications, the Court concluded that Congress had
not intended the four-year term to operate as a minimum, nor had Con-
gress intended to deny the President the power to remove U.S. Attorneys
before the expiration of their terms. Parsons dismissal was upheld,
but the Court avoided deciding whether or not the President had a con-
stitutional power of removal, sine the decision was based entirely on
statutory construction.
A similar result was reached in Shurtleff v. United States.53 Shurtleff
had been a general customs appraiser, who was removed by President
McKinley. The statute under which Shurtleff was appointed" provided
that appraisers "may be removed from office at any time Sy the President
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."3 5 The Court
first stated that had the petitioner been discharged for one of the reasons
enumerated in the statute, he would have been entitled to notice and a
hearing. Since neither was afforded, the Court concluded that the dismis-
sal was for some cause not specified in the statute. In upholding the
President's right to remove for other causes, the Court held that the
right of removal was inherent in the power of appointment, and that it
existed unless taken away by "plain and unambiguous language.""6 The
mere enumeration of certain causes for which removal might be made
was held insufficient to restrict the President's power to remove for other
causes. Again, the Court avoided deciding whether Congress could con-
stitutionally restrict the President's power to remove officers appointed
by him.
That question was finally reached in 1926, in the landmark case of
Myers v. United States.57 Myers was a postmaster at Portland, Oregon.
An act of Congress58 provided that:
[P]ostmasters of the first, second, and third class may be removed by the
president with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold their
offices for four years unless sooner removed according to lw ... .9
Myers was removed by President Wilson without any attempt to secure
the advice and consent of the Senate. Myers sued in the Court of Claims
to recover his lost pay; however, the Court of Claims ruled against him
because he had waited too long to sue.
5214 Star- 430 (1867).
0 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
5426 Star 131 (1890).
55 Id. at 136.
56 189 U.S. at 318.
57272 U.S. 52 (1926).
58 19 Star. 80 (1876).
59 Id. (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Taft, the Court held that the "powe: of removal is incident
to the power of appointment," 0 and that the statute in question (the
Tenure of Office Act), insofar as it restricted the power of the President
to -remove officers appointed by him, was unconstitutional."'
In reaching that conclusion, the Court exhaustively reviewed the his-
torical development of the removal power. The Court contrasted the
general grant of executive power contained in article II of the Consti-
tution with the specific grants of enumerated legislative powers con-
tained in article I. The Court viewed the fact that no express limitation
was placed on the power of removal as a "convincing indication that
none was intended." 62
The decision seems grounded, however, in the mandate of article II
that the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,"
and in the realization that the President might be seriously impeded in
his exercise of that duty if he were unable to remove officials who were
disloyal, incompetent, or merely uncooperative. The Court specifically
stated that the President needs "the disciplinary influence ... of a reserve
power of removal '0 3 in order to enforce the laws. The Court added:
The moment that [the President] loses confidence in the intelligence,
ability, judgment, or loyalty of any [cabinet officer] he must have the
'power to rem~ove him without dlay .... The imperative reasons requir-
ing an unrestricted power to remove the most important of his subordi-
nates in their most important duties must, therefore, control the interpre-
tation of the Constitution as to all appointed by him.(K
Three justices dissented in Myers. Justice McReynolds argued that
only clear language should give the President such unlimited power of
removal, and noted that no such language was found in the Constitution.
Justice Holmes argued that where Congress had created a position, and
had the power to transfer the power of appointment to an official other
than the President, Congress clearly had the power to restrict the manner
in which the appointee could be removed. Justice Brandeis noted that
Senate concurrence in the removal of officials had been a legislative prac-
60272 U.S. at 122.
6 t The Myers case presented the rare situation in which the Solicitor General of the
United States attacked the constitutionality of an act of Congress. As a result, the Court
permitted Senator George Wharton Pepper of Pennsylvania to participate as amicu. curiae,
urging that the statute involved was not an unconstitutional infringement on the President's
power of removal.
62272 U.S. at 128.
o8 Id. at 132.
64 Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
[Vo1.,85
NOTES
tice for nearly half a century, and that absent a judicial decision to, the
contrary, such a practice should be tantamount to judicial construction.
Perhaps the opinion of the Chief Justice was influenced by his own
years as president. Read narrowly, the decision held that the President
could remove a postmaster, appointed by him, notwithstanding congres-
sional legislation to the contrary. Read broadly, it held that the President
had the unrestricted power, under the Constitution, to remove any of-
ficial appointed by him, except for federal judges. Further, the Chief
Justice even suggested that the President could remove quasi-judicial of-
ficers, such as members of the independent regulatory agencies.6 This
suggestion led one commentator to criticize the decision as a "menacing
challenge to an administrative organization which represents years of
planning and experimentation in meeting modem conditions.""
The Court dealt with this criticism nine years later, in Humphrey's
Executor v. United States. 7 In doing so, it greatly limited the reach of
the Myers decision. Humphrey had been a member of the Federal Trade
Commission, and under the Federal Trade Commission Act any commis-
sioner could be removed by the President for "inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office." 68 Humphrey was removed from his position
by President Roosevelt, who, undoubtedly relying on the Myers decision,
candidly admitted that the removal was for policy reasons, and not one
of thecausei specified in the statute. Humphrey's executor brought suit
to recover his lost wages.
The Court first considered the nature and function of the Federal
Trade Commission, and concluded that "its duties are neither political
nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative."8
The Court noted that the Myers decision dearly covered all purely exec-
utive officers, but that it went no further, and did not include an officer
"who occupies no place in the executive department and who exercises no
part of the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President."'
The decision dearly recognized that the independence of the regulatory
agencies would be threatened, if not destroyed, if the President could re-
move members at will. The Court held that the Constitution does not
grant the President the unlimited power of removal with respect to of-
651d. at 135.
6 6 E. CORWIN, THE PRESDMENT'S REMOVAL POWER UNDER MIE CONSTMUTION 68
(1927).
67295 U.S. 602 (1935).
681d. at 622.
69d. at 627-628.
70 d. at 629.
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ficers whose positions are quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, even where
such officers were appointed by the President.71
The Supreme Court carried the doctrine of Humphrey's Executor one
step further in Wiener v. United States .7 2 Wiener had been a member
of the War Claims Board, established by Congress to receive and adjudi.
cate claims for compensation for personal injury and property damage
suffered at the hands of the enemy during the Second World War. Con.
gress had made no provision for the removal of a commissioner in the
,statute. Wiener was removed by President Eisenhower, apparently for
policy reasons, and brought suit in the Court of Claims for lost salary.
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the War
Claims Board was an adjudicatory body, with "all the paraphernalia by
which legal claims are put to the test of proof."'" The Court noted that,
by statute, the determinations of the Board were not subject to review
by any other official or court, by mandamus or otherwise. Since individ.
ual claims could not be reviewed by the President, the Court decided that
Congress did not intend for the President to influence the Board by re-
placing its members, and that under the rule of Humphrey's Executor,
Wiener's dismissal was invalid, even in the absence of an express congres-
sional restriction on the President's power of removal.
While the rules enunciated in Humphrey's Executor and W'iener have
limited the President's power to remove quasi-judicial and quasi-legisla-
tive officers,74 the President still retains the unlimited power to remove
purely "executive officers." 7,5 However, as the Perkins case indicates dif-
ferent rules apply to governmental officers appointed by officials other
than the President. Subject to certain exceptions, the federal govern-
ment has the power to discharge its employees summarily.70 One ex-
ception occurs when Congress, as in Perkins, has restricted or regulated
the power of removal. Another exception occurs when an executive de-
partment promulgates administrative regulations-having the force and
effect of law-establishing procedures governing the dismissal of em-
ployees.
It is well settled that an administrative regulation having the force
and effect of law is binding on the official who prescribed it, so long as
71Id.
72 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
73 Id. at 354.
74 In Humphrey's Executor, the Court did not provide a concrete test for dctcrznlning
whether a position is quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, or purely executive. The distinction
between the two is still somewhat less than clear.
75 Martin v. Tobin, 451 F.2d 1335, (9th Cir. 1971).
76 See Heaphy v. Bureau of Customs, 354 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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the regulation remains operative.- The Supreme Court has twice ruled
that an executive department may not discharge an employee in a man-
ner inconsistent with its own administrative regulations governing their
discharge. The first case was Seriice v. Dulles. John Service, a for-
eign service officer of the State Department, was fired by Secretary of
State Dean Acheson following the conclusion by the Loyalty Review
Board that there was reasonable doubt as to Service's loyalty. The sec-
ond case was Vitarelli r. Seaton-" Vitarelli, an educator employed by
the Interior Department, was fired because, among other things, he had
been in "sympathetic association" with alleged Communists, and because
he had allegedly concealed those associations from the government.
The Court found that neither discharge was accomplished according
to procedures mandated by existing administrative regulations, and both
were therefore illegal and of no effect. The Court's position was well
summarized by its statement in Vitarelli:
Having chosen to proceed against petititioner on security grounds, the
Secretary here, as in Service. was bound by the regulations which he
himself had promulgated for dealing with such cases, even though
without such regulations he could have discharged petitioner summar-
ily.80
Dismissal from federal employment, however, is generally a matter
of agency discretion, and judicial review of those matters is limited to
determining whether there was compliance with the required procedural
steps."- A court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the gov-
ernmental agency.82
In summary, four principles emerge from the cases on the removal
power:
(1) The President has the unlimited power to remove purely
executive officers appointed by him, and Congress cannot constitution-
ally restrict that.power, even where Congress created the position in
question.
(2) Where Congress has vested the appointment to a particular
office in some official other than the President, it may limit and regu-
late the manner in which the appointee may be removed.
77 That doctrine had its origin in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347
U.S. 260 (1954).
78354 U.S. 363 (1957).
-9 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
SO Id. at 539-40.
81 See Brown y. Zuckert, 349 F.2d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 1965); West v. Macy, 284 F.
Supp. 105, 106 (S.D. Miss. 1968).
8*, See Coledanchise v. Macy, 265 F. Supp. 154, 158 (D.S.C. 1967)
19741
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
(3) The President may remove quasi-legislative and quasi-ju
dicial officers only for cause, even where the President appointed the
officer, and even if Congress has enacted no express limitation con-
cerning removal.
(4) An executive department may not discharge employees in
a manner inconsistent with its own administrative regulations, hav-
ing the force and effect of law, governing their dismissal.
III. THE DECISION IN NADER V. BORK
After the dismissal of the Special Prosecutor, public interest advo-
cate Ralph Nader and three members of Congress"' filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Robert
Bork, the acting Attorney General, seeking a declaratory judgment that
the dismissal was in fact illegal.84 In addition, the plaintiffs sought in-
junctions reinstating Archibald Cox to his forraer position and halting
the Watergate investigation until he had reassumed control. In a cogent,
well-reasoned opinion, District Judge Gerhard Gesell held that the dis-
missal was in "clear violation of an existing Justice Department regula-
tion ... and was therefore illegal." 8"
The court began its decision by discussing the plaintiffs' standing to
litigate. Ralph Nader was summarily dismissed as a plaintiff on the au-
thority of Flast v. Cohen," because it was "abundantly clear that he had
no legal right to pursue these claims."' -, Although defendant Bork also
challenged the standing of the congressional plaintiffs, these contentions
were rejected. Citing the large number of Watergate-related bills pend-
ing in Congress, and the related possibility of the President's impeach-
ment, the court upheld the standing of the congressional plantiffs be-
cause of the effect that a declaratory judgment concerning the legality
of Cox's dismissal would have on the plaintiffs' duties as members of
Congress. The court's discussion of the standing issue is somewhat less
than persuasive, 8 but it is not directly relevant to the merits of the case
and is therefore beyond the scope of this note.
83 Senator Frank Moss (D-Utah), and Representatives Bella Abzug (D-New York), and
Jerome Waldie (D-California).
84 Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
8 5Id. at 108.
86392 U.S. 83 (1968).
s7 366 F. Supp. at 106, n.1.
88 Under the rule of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968), the Constitution requires
the plaintiff to have a requisite stake in the outcome of a case or controversy so as to insure
that the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context, and in
the form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.
Furthermore, although not constitutionally required, the Supreme Court has routinely
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The court also concluded, over the contentions of Mr. Bork, that the
controversy had not become moot, even though a new Special Prosecutor
had been appointed, and former Special Prosecutor Cox had expressed
no interest in reinstatement. Noting that the preceding events had "en-
gendered considerable public distrust of government,"'"' the court re-
marked: "There is a pressing need to declare a rule of law that will
give guidance for future conduct with regard to the Watergate inquiry."u"
Noting the possibility that the defendant's conduct might be repeated
with regard to the new Special Prosecutor, as well as the substantial pos-
sibility that pending legislation might be affected by the outcome of the
suit, the court concluded that the "situation not only saves the case from
mootness ... but forces decision."'"
refused to allow one litigant to raise the rights of a third party, except where exceptional
circumstances make it impossible for the injured party to raise his own rights. C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS § 14, at 43 (2d ed. 1970).
In Nader v. Bork, it would appear that the plaintiffs were essentially raising the rights
of the discharged Special Prosecutor, who declined to join the suit. It appears that they
had no personal stake in the outcome of the case, other than the fact that the result may
have affected their duties as members of Congress. Although the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia upheld a similar claim of standing in Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d
611 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the duties of the members of Congress may well be affcted by
countless pieces of litigation pending in courts across the country, and to hold that they
have standing to intervene in such suits, or to bring such suits themselves, merely because
the suits may affect pending legislation, is a novel proposition indeed.
A much stronger case for such standing (not cited in Nader z'. Bork) is Williams v.
Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973), where the court permitted members of the
Senate to bring an action to remove the acting director of the Office of Economic Opportu-
nity, on the ground that he had not been confirmed by the Senate, as required by s:atute.
There, the members of the Senate had been denied their right to confirm or reject the
acting director. Unlike the OEO Director, the Special Prosecutor was not subject to Senate
confirmation.
8 9 366 F. Supp. at 106.
o ld.
911d. at 106-07. The judicial power of the United States clearly does not include the
power to decide moot questions. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACtiCE
ANM PROCEDURE § 21, at 88 (Wright ed. 1960). Had the real controversy in Nader s'.
Bork been between the Acting Attorney General and Archibald Cox, who had not sought
reinstatement, and had reassumed his duties at Harvard, it would be difficult to argue that
the case was not moot.
However, accepting arguendo the court's determination that the congressional plaintiffs
had standing to maintain the action, the court's conclusion that the case was not moot
becomes more tenable. Professor Moore has written that "performance of the particular
act sought to be enjoined may moot the injunction issue, but where there is a liklihood
that the act complained of will be repeated . . . a declaratory judgment may be rendered
to define the rights and obligations of the parties. 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
57.13, at 57-133 (1974).
In United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n., Inc. 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968),
an antitrust suit for injunctive relief, the Court refused to hold that the controversy was moot,
but stated that it "might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear ... that
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur."
In Nader v. Bork, it was certainly not clear that the wrongful behavior-the.dismissal
of a Special Prosecutor without compliance with procedures required by existing administra-
tive regulations-could not reasonably be expected to recur.
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The court, however, denied all injunctive relief. In doing so, it re-
lied on rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, apparently
concluding that the ousted Special Prosecutor Cox was an indispensable
party.
Turning to the merits, the court first noted, significantly, that the
Special Prosecutor was appointed by the Attorney General and not the
President, thus removing the Special Prosecutor from the ambit of the
Ayers decision. The court also noted that the Attorney General derived
his authority to appoint a Special Prosecutor from acts of Congress,"2
and therefore, under the Perkins rule, 3 Congress could limit the man-
ner in which the Special Prosecutor could be removed. Since Congress
had delegated that power to the Attorney General 4 and former Attor-
ney General Richardson had chosen to limit his power of removal by
prescribing administrative regulations, which provided that the Special
Prosecutor could be removed only for extraordinary improprieties, 5 the
Attorney General and his successors were bound by those regulations.
Although defendant Bork might have plausibly argued that Cox's refusal
to obey a direct presidential order constituted an extraordinary impro-
priety per se, Bork freely admitted, and the court found, that there had
been no extraordinary impropriety.00
Under the rules laid down by the Supreme Court in Service and Vi-
tarelli, then, the court had little choice but to conclude, as it did, that the
dismissal was illegal.
The only question remaining was whether the subsequent rescissionT
of the removal regulations effectively discharged Cox at the time of re-
92 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1970) provides:
All functions of other officers of the Department of Justice and all functions of
agencies and employees of the Department of justice are vested in the Attorney
General except for the functions-(1) vested by subchapter 11 of chapter 5 of title 5 in hearing examiners cm-
ployed by the Department of justice;
(2) of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc.;
(3) of the Board of Directors and officers of the Federal Prison Industires, Inc.;
and
(4) of the Board of Parole.
28 U.S.C. § 510 (1970) provides:
The Attorney General may from time to time make such provisions as he con.
siders appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, employee, or
agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General.
93 United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
94 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) provides in part: "The Head of an Executive Department
or military Department may prescribe regulations for the government of his department
95 28 C.F.R. § 0.37 (1973).
06 366 F. Supp. at 107 (D.D.C. 1973).
97 38 Fed. Reg. 29466 (1973).
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scission. The court quickly concluded that it had not. The court noted
that an agency's power to revoke its own regulations is not absolute-
the action must be "neither arbitrary nor unreasonable""" and that vir-
tually the same regulations were reinstated only three weeks after the re-
scission. The court concluded that the rescission was merely a "ruse" to
discharge Special Prosecutor Cox, and that it was therefore both arbi-
trary and unreasonable.
The court's conclusion that the Special Prosecutor's dismissal was il-
legal is persuasive and well supported by the court's citations of authority.
But the fact that the Special Prosecutor was an appointee of the Attor-
ney General, as well as the existence of an administrative regulation re-
stricting the Attorney General's power to discharge the Special Prosecu-
tor, made it possible to dispose of the case without considering the more
difficult questions concerning the President's power of removal.
Despite the court's conclusion that the Special Prosecutor was an
appointee of the Attorney General, the discharge was clearly a case of
presidential removal. The Acting Attorney General fired Cox after he
was ordered to do so by the President, and after the Attorney General
had resigned and the Deputy Attorney General had been fired rather
than carry out the President's instructions. In the Myers case, the post-
master was technically dismissed by the Postmaster General, acting on
orders of the President, but the Supreme Court treated the case exclusive-
ly as one of presidential removal.
In a statement released after he fired the Special Prosecutor, Acting
Attorney General Bork argued that the President has the power to dis-
charge "any member of the Executive Branch he chooses."09  There is
scant judicial authority to support that proposition.' °0 Instead, the
cases almost unanimously hold that the power of removal is incident to
the power of appointment,10' implying that the appointing officer-in
this case the Attorney General-has the power of removal, and not the
President. Although the rules enunciated in the Service and Vitarelli
cases have apparently never been applied to a presidential removal, there
is no logical reason to conclude that while the Attorney General and
his successors are bound by departmental regulations, the President is
98366 F. Supp. at 108.
9 9 Hearings before the Senate Committee on the judiciary on the Special Prosecutor,
93d Congress, 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 157 (1973).
10oSee, e.g., Haynes v. Thomas, 232 F.2d 688, 692 (D.C. Cir., 1956): "In the exercise
of his power to employ and discharge executive personnel, which is absolute unless limited
by statute, the President cab .... "
11 See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896, rehearing
denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119 (1926); Bailey
v. Richardson, 182-E2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir., 1950), afd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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not. Therefore, the fact that the removal in the instant case was insti-
gated by the President, and not the Attorney General, should not legiti-
mize the Special Prosecutor's dismissal. Nor should the fact that the
President initiated the removal preclude judicial review of the action,
or even injunctive relief, where appropriate, ordering the Attorney Gen-
eral to reinstate the discharged Special Prosecutor. 2
A more difficult question not reached in Nader v. Bork is whether a
Special Prosecutor-if appointed by the President' 03-is an executive
officer, removable by the President under the Myers decision regardless of
administrative regulations, or a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative officer
protected by the rule of Humphrey's Executor. Stressing the Special
Prosecutor's need for independence, Archibald Cox himself argued that
the Myers case did not cover a Special Prosecutor, since his position was
"sufficiently like that of a member of an administrative agency like the
NLRB or FCC that Congress could restrict the power of appoint-
ment."1 4 This position would probably be difficult to sustain. Regard-
less of his need for independence, the Special Prosecutor, unlike mem-
bers of the regulatory agencies, was not engaged in quasi-judicial or
quasi-legislative activity. Prosecution is clearly an executive function, for
which the Attorney General, and ultimately the President, retain respon-
sibility.1 5 Furthermore, the prosecutorial function is almost clearly in-
cluded in the mandate of article 11 of the Constitution, that the Presi-
dent shall "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." As long as
an official, such as a Special Prosecutor, is performing an executive func-
tion in the executive branch, it is difficult to escape the reaches of the
Myers decision, although the failure of the Supreme Court to articulate
a clear-cut test for determining whether an officer is "purely executive"
or "quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative" makes it impossible to say with
certainty that a Special Pr6secutor belongs in one category or the other.
IV. PROPOSALS TO INSURE THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR'S INDEPENDENCE
The dismissal of the Special Prosecutor has led to a number of pro-
posals designed to guarantee the independence of future Special Prose-
cutors and to prevent their dismissal by officials in the executive branch
102 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
103Although Archibald Cox was not appointed by the President, the question could
arise in the future should Congress grant the President the power to appoint a new Special
Prosecutor. E.g., S.2616, 93d Congress, 1st Sess. (1973), would have given the President
that power.
104 Hearings belorw the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on tho Special Prosecttor,
93d Congress, 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 69-70 (1973).
10528 U.S.C. §§ 503, 510 (1970).
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of government. One group of proposals would transfer the power to
appoint a Special Prosecutor to officials outside the executive branch. It
is highly doubtful that Congress has the power to appoint a Special
Prosecutor.'0 6 A more difficult question is whether the federal courts
could be empowered to appoint such a prosecutor."" Although a
"wealth of common law and statutory authority"'" permits state courts
to appoint special prosecutors where the prosecuting attorney has an in-
terest in the case, such a procedure is "apparently unprecedented in the
federal courts."'19 A federal statute"(' permits the district courts to tem-
porarily appoint U.S. Attorneys when vacancies occur, but the appoint-
ments continue only until the ,acancies are filled.
Artide II, § 2 of the Constitution provides: "[T]he Congress may
by law vest the Appointment of such inferior officers, as they think prop-
er, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of De-
partments." In Ex parte Siebold,"' the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of a federal statute providing for the appointment of
election supervisors by the circuit courts of the United States. Despite
an earlier statement that "the appointing power ... was no doubt intended
to be exercised by the department of the government to which the offi-
cer to be appointed most appropriately belonged,""! the Siebold Court
stated that "there is no absolute requirement to this effect in the Consti-
tution.""13  Finding no "incongruity" between the courts' judicial duties
and their duties to appoint inferior officers, the Supreme Court upheld
the statute.
In Hobson v. Hansen,"4 a three judge panel upheld the constitution-
ality of an act of Congress providing for the appointment of District of
Columbia School Board members by the district court. The court noted
10 6See U.S. v. Ferreira, 45 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 51 (1851); Washington v. Clark, 84 F.
Supp. 964, 966 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'dsub. nom. Washington v. McGrath, 183 F.2d 375 (1950),
afl'd, 341 U.S. 923 (1951) ("The Congress has no authority . . . to appoint persons to
the Executive branch of the Government .... That would be an unconstitutional limitation
on the President's power of appointment, which is untrammeled under Article II of the
Constitution.") (Opinion of Holtzoff, J.); cf. Springer v. The Philippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189, 202 (1928).
1o7S. 2611, 93d Congress, 1st Sess (1973), would have vested the appointment of a spe-
cial prosecutor in the chief judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
108Note, The Special Prosecutor in the Federal System: A Proposal, 11 AM. CRAD.
L REV. 577 (1973).
109 Id.
11028 U.S.C. § 546 (1970). The validity of that statute was upheld in United States
v. Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
1 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
112 Ex parte Hlennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257-58 (1839).
113 100 U.S. at 397.
114 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967).
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that if an individual litigant felt that a particular judge had a personal
bias or prejudice resulting from an exercise of the appointment power,
the litigant could have the judge disqualified by filing a "sufficient affida-
vit."n15
But those cases may not entirely dispose of the constitutional objec-
tions to a court-appointed Special Prosecutor. Article II, § I provides
that "the executive Power shall be vested in [the] President," and article
II, § 3 states that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted." Vesting the appointment of a Special Prosecutor in the federal
courts would restrict the President's control over the executive branch in
the enforcement of criminal statutes, an area traditionally considered to
be an executive function." 6 That factor might well render the propo-
sal unconstitutional." 7
Even if the courts could constitutionally appoint a Special Prosecutor,
there are other, non-constitutional objections which would undoubtedly
be raised. In Nader v. Bork" Judge Gesell noted:
The suggestion that the Judiciary be given responsibility for the appoint-
ment and supervision of a new Watergate Special Prosecutor ... is most
unfortunate .... The Courts must remain neutral. Their duties are not
prosecutorial.1 0
The problems inherent in vesting the appointment of a new Special
Prosecutor in the federal courts suggest that other remedies may be nec-
essary. Some people have advocated the creation of an independent
agency to police the executive branch. Washington lawyer Lloyd Cutler
has suggested the possibility of what Time magazine calls the "Office of
the Public Prosecutor General.' 120  According to the plan, the "P.P.G."
would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for
a term of fifteen years. His job would be to investigate and prosecute
"charges involving official misconduct and campaign law violations by
the Administration." The P.P.G. could be dismissed only for a "gross
breach of duty," or for the commission of a crime.
Others would go even farther. Frank Hogan, late District Attorney
of Manhattan, advocated completely removing the Attorney General's
115 Id. at 916.
116 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-164 (1926).
117 But see Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955) ("tTjhe powers of law
enforcement . .. are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary."),
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Chatsworth Cooperative Marketing Ass'n., 347 F.2d 821,
822 (7th Cir. 1965) ("[Ihe powers of law enforcement are not wholly assigned to the execu-
tive department.").
118 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
119 Id. at 109.
120 TIME, December 3, 1973, at 73.
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power to prosecute, and placing it in the office of a Prosecutor General,
which would be-ideally, at least-above politics.12  The Attorney Gen-
eral would remain, but only as legal counsel to the government. Hogan
argued that it is difficult for even the "best person" to be both the lawyer
for the administration and an independent decision maker, and that com-
plete independence of the prosecutor from the influence of partisan pol-
itics is essential to the proper administration of justice.
V. CONCLUSION
It is probably unrealistic to expect the executive branch to police itself
and to ferret out improper conduct, or even criminal activity, within its
own ranks. The dismissal of the Special Prosecutor strongly suggests
the need for the creation of an independent agency to perform that func-
tion. That approach is clearly not without problems. The agency might
easily become overzealous in an effort to justify its existence. A con-
stitutional amendment might be required to re-allocate a portion of the
Presidents duties to execute the laws faithfully. Nonetheless, that ap-
proach seems preferable to restricting the President's power to remove
executive officers. The President's need for the removal power is criti-
cal; in the last resort, his control over the executive branch depends upon
itY22 It is therefore essential to devise some effective method of policing
the executive branch, without unduly interfering with the President's
ability to carry out the duties vested in him by the Constitution.
Kenneth IV. Christman*
21 N.Y. Times, May 17, 1973, at 49, col. 7.
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